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sons voluntarily may reduce their coverage and hence their prem-
iums for basic economic loss to the extent of their coverage under
health insurance plans.'7'
Although several sections of the recent no-fault amendment
appear to deal adequately with provisions of the original statute
that were susceptible to exploitation and abuse, the major thrust of
the legislation, a change in the definition of a serious injury, proba-
bly will not lead to a substantial reduction in litigation. It therefore
is hoped that the legislature will monitor closely the operation of the
statute and revamp it as necessary to attain the objectives underly-
ing the no-fault concept.
DEVELOPMENTS IN NEW YORK LAW
Appropriation of public personality held actionable.
Section 51 of the Civil Rights Law, which grants a cause of
action for damages to "any person whose name, portrait, or picture"
is used for commercial purposes without his written consent,'72 con-
' N.Y. INS. LAW § 672(7) (McKinney Supp. 1977-1978). The new legislation also requires
insurers to offer higher deductibles to policy holders. Id. § 167(d)(iii); Memorandum of State
Executive Department, reprinted in [1977] N.Y. Laws 2445 (McKinney), wherein it was
stated:
The requirement that insurers offer a variety of higher deductibles, would reduce
rates for those retaining the $200 standard deductible or electing a higher deducti-
ble. In many cases those electing higher deductibles will be in a position to utilize
tax offsets to greatly minimize the real loss suffered.
Id. at 2457.
It should be noted, however, that there is "considerable indication that any price rise in
auto insurance has been due not to difficulties under inadequate no-fault laws, but to rapidly
rising prices, a factor applicable to all auto insurance, in fault-based states and no-fault states
alike." No-Fault Auto Laws, supra note 152, at 35. The state, according to former Superin-
tendent of Insurance Harnett, is powerless to prevent premium increases occasioned by the
rising price of such items as replacement parts for automobiles. Greenhouse, Carey Moves to
Cut No-Fault Costs, N.Y. Times, Apr. 21, 1977, at 1, col. 2.
,7 N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 51 (McKinney 1976) provides in pertinent part:
Any person whose name, portrait or picture is used within this state for adver-
tising purposes or for the purposes of trade without the written consent first ob-
tained as above provided may maintain an equitable action in the supreme court
of this state against the person, firm or corporation so using his name, portrait or
picture, to prevent and restrain the use thereof; and may also sue and recover
damages for any injuries sustained by reason of such use and if the defendant shall
have knowingly used such person's name, portrait or picture in such manner as is
forbidden or declared to be unlawful by the last section, the jury, in its discretion,
may award exemplary damages.
In addition to the civil cause of action provided by § 51, the Civil Rights Law provides a
misdemeanor penalty for the nonconsensual use of a name, portrait, or picture:
A person, firm or corporation that uses for advertising purposes, or for the
purposes of trade, the name, portrait or picture of any living person without having
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sistently has been construed by the courts as providing compensa-
tion only for emotional injury.1 3 When the legislature enacted this
statute in 1903, it probably did not foresee the technological ad-
vances which have led to sophisticated forms of media and a con-
comitant growth of the advertising industry."4 Prompted by these
developments, courts and commentators have begun to recognize
that the commercial exploitation of certain public personalities may
cause pecuniary loss as well as emotional injury.'75 To afford such
individuals a basis for relief, some jurisdictions have fashioned a
common law right of publicity, 76 infringement of which gives rise to
first obtained the written consent of such person, or if a minor of his or her parent
or guardian, is guilty of a misdemeanor.
N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 50 (McKinney 1976).
An article written in 1890 by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis is widely credited with
having prompted legislatures and courts to afford recognition to the right of privacy. The
basic thrust of that article was that all persons have a "right to be let alone" and that
invasions of this right should be compensable in money damages. Warren & Brandeis, The
Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890). In 1902, the Court of Appeals was presented
with its first opportunity to adopt the view enunciated by Warren and Brandeis. In Roberson
v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 (1902), plaintiff alleged that her
picture had been used without her consent on 25,000 printed advertisements. Id. at 542, 64
N.E. at 442. The court denied relief stating that "the so-called 'right of privacy' has not yet
found an abiding place in our jurisprudence .... Id. at 556, 64 N.E. at 447. In response to
the public's disapproval of Roberson, the 1903 legislature enacted the predecessors of §§ 50
& 51, see, e.g., Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc., 18 N.Y.2d 324, 327, 221 N.E.2d 543, 544, 274
N.Y.S.2d 877, 878 (1966); Lahiri v. Daily Mirror, Inc., 162 Misc. 776, 778, 295 N.Y.S. 382,
384 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1937); Blair v. Union Free School Dist., 67 Misc. 2d 248, 248, 324
N.Y.S.2d 222, 223 (Dist. Ct. Suffolk County 1971), which, 5 years later, were sustained in
the face of a constitutional challenge. Rhodes v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 193 N.Y. 223, 85
N.E. 1097 (1908).
" Although the statute does not specify hurt feelings as the sole element of compensable
injury, the courts, relying upon the intent of the enacting legislature, have limited recovery
under § 51 to such damages. See, e.g., Flores v. Mosler Safe Co., 7 N.Y.2d 276, 280, 164
N.E.2d 853, 855, 196 N.Y.S.2d 975, 978 (1959); Gautier v. Pro-Football, Inc., 304 N.Y. 354,
361, 107 N.E.2d 485, 489 (1952) (Desmond, J., concurring); Booth v. Curtis Publishing Co.,
15 App. Div. 2d 343, 356, 223 N.Y.S.2d 737, 749 (1st Dep't) (Eager, J., dissenting), aff'd mem.,
11 N.Y.2d 907, 182 N.E.2d 812, 228 N.Y.S.2d 468 (1962); Paulsen v. Personality Posters, Inc.,
59 Misc. 2d 444, 450, 299 N.Y.S.2d 501, 508 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1968). See note 200 infra.
"I A noted commentator has stated that "[t]he innovators of the privacy doctrine could
not have foreseen the advent of radio, television and motion pictures, and the concomitant
scope and variety of commercial exploitations of names, likenesses and personalities of indi-
viduals." Gordon, Right of Property in Name, Likeness, Personality and History, 55 Nw. U.L.
REv. 553, 554 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Gordon].
I' E.g., Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953); Gordon, supra note 174, at 554-55; Nimmer, The
Right of Publicity, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. PROa. 203, 203-04 (1954) [hereinafter cited as Nim-
mer; Note, The Right of Publicity-Protection for Public Figures and Celebrities, 42
BROOKLYN L. REv. 527, 557 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Right of Publicity].
' See Gordon, supra note 174; Nimmer, supra note 175; Right of Publicity, supra note
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a cause of action independent of the well-established invasion of
privacy action."' While acknowledging its desirability, the New
York courts have been reluctant to definitively recognize an action
premised upon the appropriation of a public personality.' 8 Re-
cently, however, in Lombardo v. Doyle, Dane & Bernbach, Inc.,',"
the Appellate Division, Second Department, presented with an op-
portunity to address this area, upheld a cause of action based on a
common law right of publicity,'8 while denying relief under section
51 of the Civil Rights Law.18'
The Lombardo plaintiff was a famous bandleader, especially
well-known for his New Years' Eve performances. Defendants, an
advertising agency and one of its clients, an automobile manufac-
turer, attempted to procure plaintiff's services for a television com-
mercial. The commercial was to depict plaintiff leading his band in
its famous rendition of "Auld Lang Syne" amidst a New Years' Eve
setting while defendant's cars were being displayed to the viewing
audience. Following unsuccessful negotiations with plaintiff, defen-
dants produced the commercial, employing an actor and another
band.8 2 Lombardo thereupon commenced an action, alleging inva-
sion of his privacy under sections 50 and 51 of the Civil Rights Law
and appropriation of his public personality.'83 The Supreme Court,
Nassau County, denied a motion to dismiss both causes of action
and defendants appealed.'"" While unanimously upholding the right
of publicity cause of action, the appellate division, by a 3-2 margin,
dismissed the claim based upon the Civil Rights Law.'85
177 Many commentators favor the creation of a separate right of publicity. See, e.g.,
Gordon, supra note 174; Nimmer, supra note 175; Right of Publicity, supra note 175; Com-
ment, Why Not a Relational Right of Privacy?-or Right of Property, 42 U. Mo. K.C. L. REV.
175 (1973). In contrast, Dean Prosser proposed a broad right of privacy which would embrace
all types of interests including those protected by the right of publicity. See W. PROSSER, LAW
OF TORTS § 117, at 804 (4th ed. 1971), wherein it is stated: "To date the law of privacy
comprises four distinct kinds of invasion of four different interests of the plaintiff, which are
tied together by the common name .... " The four categories enumerated by Prosser are
intrusion on an individual's physical solitude, public disclosure of private facts, false public-
ity, and appropriation of name or likeness for defendant's advantage. Id. at 804-14. This
suggested scheme has been incorporated into the second Restatement of Torts. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 652A, 652C (Tent. Draft No. 22 1976).
See notes 195-196 and accompanying text infra.
77 58 App. Div. 2d 620, 396 N.Y.S.2d 661 (2d Dep't 1977) (mem.).
Id. at 622, 396 N.Y.S.2d 664.
Id.
17 Id. at 622-23, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 665 (Titone, J., & Suozzi, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
" Id. at 620, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 663. Plaintiff had included a cause of action for breach of
contract which claim was not before the court on appeal. Id.
"I Id.
Is5 Id.
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In dismissing plaintiff's right to privacy cause of action, the
majority observed that the statute, consistent with its express provi-
sions, has been construed to prohibit unauthorized use of only an
individual's name, portrait, or picture."6 Adopting this literal inter-
pretation of the Civil Rights Law, the Lombardo court rejected
plaintiffs argument that the use of a person's reputation or image
should be equated to the use of his name or picture for the purposes
of that statute. 1 7
Justices Titone and Suozzi dissented from the majority's hold-
ing with respect to the privacy cause of action. 88 Arguing for a more
liberal reading of section 51, the dissent drew on several cases to
support its view that the use of plaintiffs actual name or picture is
not a prerequisite to recovery. According to Justices Titone and
Suozzi, in determining liability a court should examine "the nature
and quality of the alleged representation, the medium in which it
is presented, and the reasonable understanding of the public with
respect thereto."' 89 The dissent concluded that a cause of action
I" Id. at 621, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 663-64. Because a criminal penalty may be imposed under
§ 50, many courts have taken the position that the sections should be strictly construed. See,
e.g., Binns v. Vitagraph Co., 210 N.Y. 51, 55, 103 N.E. 1108, 1109-10 (1913); Humiston v.
Universal Film Mfg. Co., 189 App. Div. 467, 476, 178 N.Y.S. 752, 759 (lst Dep't 1919); Vogel
v. Hearst Corp., 116 N.Y.S.2d 905, 906 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1952). But see Jackson v.
Consumer Publications, Inc., 169 Misc. 1022, 10 N.Y.S.2d 691 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County), aff'd
mem., 256 App. Div. 965, 10 N.Y.S.2d 694 (lst Dep't 1939), wherein the court rejected the
argument that §§ 50 & 51 should be strictly construed. The fallacy of this position, the court
stated, was that it failed to "separate the penal from the remedial features of the law." 169
Misc. at 1024, 10 N.Y.S.2d at 693. Other courts have found that a strict interpretation would
not be in accord with the legislation's remedial purpose. Flores v. Mosler Safe Co., 7 N.Y.2d
276, 280-81, 164 N.E.2d 853, 855, 196 N.Y.S.2d 975, 978 (1959); Lahiri v. Daily Mirror, Inc.,
162 Misc. 776, 779, 295 N.Y.S. 382, 385 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1937). It should be noted,
however, that the Court of Appeals has not abandoned the position enunciated in Binns that
the statute is to be strictly construed.
'i 58 App. Div. 2d at 622, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 664.
"" Id., 396 N.Y.S.2d at 665 (Titone, J., & Suozzi, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
" Id. at 623, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 666 (Titone, J., & Suozzi, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). The dissent relied heavily on Binns v. Vitagraph Co., 210 N.Y. 51, 103
N.E. 1108 (1913), to support its position that use of the actual name or picture is not necessary
under the statute. In Binns, the plaintiff had been responsible for the rescue of hundreds of
persons after a shipwreck. Defendant produced films reenacting the events using plaintiff's
name and an actor to portray him. Id. at 52-53, 103 N.E. at 1109. In addition, plaintiff's name
was prominently displayed in advertisements of the films. Id. at 57, 103 N.E. at 1110. The
Court upheld plaintiff's § 51 claim, id. at 58, 103 N.E. at 1111, encountering little difficulty
in finding an unauthorized use of plaintiffs picture:
A picture within the meaning of the statute is not necessarily a photograph of
the living person, but includes any representation of such person. The picture
represented by the defendant to be a true picture of the plaintiff, and exhibited to
the public as such, was intended to be, and it was, a representation of the plaintiff.
19771
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under section 51 had been stated and that the trier of the facts
should be given the opportunity to determine whether the public
could have reasonably believed that the commercial depicted the
plaintiff. ""
In contrast to the privacy cause of action, the second depart-
ment found that plaintiff's right of publicity claim was predicated
upon a common law property right which recognizes the value of an
individual's public personality.' 9' Explaining that plaintiff had
spent 40 years developing his image as "Mr. New Years' Eve, an
identity that has some marketable status," the court concluded that
this image was a valuable property interest entitled to legal protec-
tion.12 To support this conclusion, the appellate division pointed to
several decisions which, in its opinion, establish that "there is no
question but that a celebrity has a legitimate proprietary interest
in his public personality ...."I"
It is submitted that the Lombardo court's recognition of a dis-
tinct cause of action based on the right of publicity marks the final
step of a discernible evolution in New York decisional law. Although
previous decisions have discussed this right only in dictum, they
nevertheless support the ultimate recognition of a valid cause of
action premised upon it. Stemming from a decision rendered by a
Id.'at 57, 103 N.E. at 1110. The Court seemingly was influenced by the possibility that use
of plaintiff's name in connection with the picture of the actor had led the public to believe
that it was actually plaintiff whom they were viewing. Although the Binns situation was
similar to the factual setting in which Lombardo arose, the precedential value of the Binns
Court's discussion of the picture is diminished by the fact that relief was nonetheless avail-
able due to the unauthorized use of plaintiff's name.
Of the other cases relied upon by the dissent, two involved use of plaintiff's name, while
the third was decided under California law. See Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco
Co., 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1974) (California law); Uproar Co. v. NBC, 8 F. Supp. 358 (D.
Mass. 1934), modified on other grounds, 81 F.2d 373 (1st Cir. 1936) (plaintiff's name used);
Orsini v. Eastern Wine Corp., 190 Misc. 235, 73 N.Y.S.2d 426 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1947),
af'd, 273 App. Div. 947, 78 N.Y.S.2d 224 (1st Dep't 1948) (plaintiff's name used). The
Lombardo majority similarly distinguished the cases cited by the dissent. 58 App. Div. 2d at
621, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 663-64.
1" 58 App. Div. 2d at 623, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 666 (Titone, J., & Suozzi, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
"1 58 App. Div. 2d at 621, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 664. For a discussion of the differences
between the right of publicity and the right of privacy, see notes 200-201, 205 and accompany-
ing text infra.
112 58 App. Div. 2d at 622, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 664. The majority relied upon, inter alia,
Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Urban Systems, Inc., 72 Misc. 2d 788, 340 N.Y.S.2d 144 (Sup.
Ct. N.Y. County), modified on other grounds mem., 42 App. Div. 2d 544, 345 N.Y.S.2d 17
(1st Dep't 1973), discussed in note 195 infra, in finding that a public personality is entitled
to legal protection.
"1 58 App. Div. 2d at 622, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 664.
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federal court applying New York law in a diversity suit,' the New
York cases discussing the right of publicity intimate that the right
to exploit one's public personality is an interest worthy of protec-
tion.9 5 Moreover, the courts appear to have rejected incorporation
' Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953). In Haelan, plaintiff, a chewing gum manufacturer, had con-
tracted for the exclusive use of a baseball player's picture in connection with the sale of its
product. Plaintiff charged that defendant, a rival chewing gum manufacturer, had induced
the baseball player to breach his contract. Defendant countered this charge by arguing that
plaintiff in effect did not have a binding contract with the ball player. He posited that if
plaintiff had used the player's picture without consent, the player's only right in New York
would have been an action for invasion of privacy under § 51. Since that right is strictly
personal and therefore not assignable, defendant contended that plaintiff's contract with the
player amounted to a mere release from potential liability under the statute. Id. at 867. In a
widely cited opinion authored by Judge Frank, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit rejected this argument and found that under New York law the ball player
validly had contracted with plaintiff for the exclusive use of his picture:
We think that, in addition to and independent of that right of privacy (which in
New York derives from statute), a man has a right in the publicity value of his
photograph, i.e., the right to grant the exclusive privilege of publishing his picture,
and that such a grant may validly be made "in gross," i.e., without an accompany-
ing transfer of a business or of anything else.
Id. at 868.
While the Haelan decision has been praised by commentators and adopted by courts of
other jurisdictions, its interpretation of New York law seems erroneous. Of the two New York
decisions which the court cited as recognizing a right of publicity, one was a contract case
while the other was based on a claim of unfair competition. In the contract case, Wood v.
Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 222 N.Y. 88, 118 N.E. 214 (1917), the New York Court of Appeals
had held that a plaintiff who had been given the exclusive right to endorse, on behalf of
defendant, fashions designed by others, impliedly promised to use reasonable efforts in secur-
ing business. Id. at 92, 118 N.E. at 215. Although Wood implicitly may recognize the individ-
ual's right to assign the use of his name, it is submitted that the decision does not support
the Haelan court's adoption of a broad right of publicity. The other case cited by the Second
Circuit, Madison Square Garden Corp. v. Universal Pictures Co., 255 App. Div. 459, 7
N.Y.S.2d 845 (1st Dep't 1938), involved a defendant who allegedly had used pictures of a
professional hockey team in a fictionalized movie and falsely advertised the movie as contain-
ing actual footage of games played in the plaintiff's arena. Id. at 462-63, 7 N.Y.S.2d at 848-
49. In holding that plaintiff stated a valid cause of action for unfair competitidn,the court
found that defendant, through its deceptive practices, had misappropriated plaintiff's
"property right[s] in its good name, its reputation, and its goodwill." Id. at 466, 7 N.Y.S.2d
at 851. Thus, although the action involved unfair competition, the court discussed rights
similar to those embodied in the Haelan court's notion of the right of publicity. A common
law action for unfair competition, however, is much more limited than an action premised
upon the right of publicity. The former generally requires a showing that the two parties were
in actual competition, Nimmer, supra note 175, at 210, and that there was a "palming off of
the goods or business of one person as that of another," id. at 212 (quoting ABC v. Wahl Co.,
36 F. Supp. 167, 168 (S.D.N.Y. 1940)). As a result, the actions differ greatly in scope.
Despite its questionable reading of New York law, the Haelan decision often has been
relied upon by the federal courts in New York. See Grant v. Esquire, Inc., 367 F. Supp. 876,
880 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Booth v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 362 F. Supp. 343, 347 (S.D.N.Y. 1973);
Chaplin v. N.B.C., 15 F.R.D. 134, 139-40 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
" Three major decisions in New York have addressed the issue of a right of publicity.
In Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 58 Misc. 2d 1, 294 N.Y.S.2d 122 (Sup.
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of the right of publicity into section 51 as an acceptable means of
protecting that right. 9 ' Lombardo thus presented the second de-
partment with the opportunity formally to adopt the holding which
these decisions foreshadowed: recognition of a separate and inde-
pendent right of publicity.
The publicity right recognized by the Lombardo court essen-
tially is an intangible property interest consisting of an individual's
Ct. N.Y. County 1968), aff'd mem., 32 App. Div. 2d 892, 301 N.Y.S.2d 948 (1st Dep't 1969),
the court ultimately dismissed plaintiff's action on the ground that the unconsented-to biog-
raphy in question was constitutionally protected. In the course of its opinion, however, the
court indicated that a separate right of publicity might exist in New York. Recognizing that
the plaintiff was claiming violations of the right of privacy and the right of publicity, the
Rosemont court stated that "the various allegations ... on the one hand. . . appear to fall
within the language of the New York 'privacy statute,' and on the other hand . . . have
relevance to the separately recognized 'right of publicity.'" 58 Misc. 2d at 3-4, 294 N.Y.S.2d
at 126 (citing Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953)).
Seven months later, Justice Frank, who had authored the Rosemont opinion, had another
opportunity to discuss the right of publicity in Paulsen v. Personality Posters, Inc., 59 Misc.
2d 444, 299 N.Y.S.2d 501 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1968). Finding that the right of publicity
had "been awarded some . . . recognition," the court went on to declare that New York had
shown no intent to "adopt or follow such construction within the context of section 51." Id.
at 450, 299 N.Y.S.2d at 508. As in Rosemont, the remarks concerning the right of publicity
were mere dictum, since the court disposed of the case on constitutional grounds. See id.
More recently, the Supreme Court, New York County, rendered a decision in Rosemont
Enterprises, Inc. v. Urban Systems, Inc., 72 Misc. 2d 788, 340 N.Y.S.2d 144 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County), modified on other grounds mem., 42 App. Div. 2d 544, 345 N.Y.S.2d 17 (1st Dep't
1973). While the action in Urban was commenced under § 51 of the Civil Rights Law, the
court found the right of publicity relevant to the case:
The instant action is quite clearly premised upon an appropriation for commercial
exploitation of plaintiff's property rights in his name and career rather than upon
an injury to feelings. There is no question but that a celebrity has a legitimate
proprietary interest in his public personality.
72 Misc. 2d at 790, 340 N.Y.S.2d at 146. Thus, the court clearly recognized that a public
personality is entitled to legal protection. In light of its concluding remarks, however, it is
uncertain whether the court granted relief under the Civil Rights Law, the right of publicity,
or both: "The court in the present situation has no difficulty in finding that the marketing
and publication of the game are violative of the Civil Rights Law." Id. at 791, 340 N.Y.S.2d
at 147.
"' See note 195 supra. The Appellate Division, First Department, in Gautier v. Pro-
Football, Inc., 278 App. Div. 431, 106 N.Y.S.2d 553 (1st Dep't 1951), aff'd, 304 N.Y. 354, 107
N.E.2d 485 (1952), had occasion to discuss the limited scope of § 51. The Gautier plaintiff
alleged that his performance as an animal trainer had been telecast on local television,
without his consent, in violation of his right of privacy under § 51. 278 App. Div. at 432-33,
106 N.Y.S.2d at 555. In dismissing plaintiff's claim, the court emphasized that the Civil
Rights Law protected against only injury to the person and that a cause of action under that
statute could not be established by claiming injury to business or property:
[Ilt is clear that this statute was never intended to apply to cases like the instant
one. . . . It provided primarily a recovery for injury to the person, not to his
property or business. . . . [Ilt is the injury to the person not to the property which
establishes the cause of action. That is the focal point of the statute.
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exclusive right to utilize and alienate his public personality. 7 Simi-
lar to an action for appropriation of tangible property, which serves
as a vehicle for the recovery of profits generated by the wrongful
act,' 8 a successful suit founded upon the right of publicity should
give rise to a substantial damage award. Although the proper mea-
sure of damages must be established by the judiciary in the future,
it is suggested that in so doing the courts consider factors such as
the profits realized by the defendant and the opportunities lost by
the plaintiff.' 5 Irrespective of the exact damage formula ultimately
adopted, the proprietary nature of the publicity right should afford
claimants an avenue for more substantial monetary relief than that
provided by the injury-oriented right of privacy theory."'
Id. at 438, 106 N.Y.S.2d at 560 (citations omitted). On appeal the Court of Appeals affirmed
on the ground that plaintiff's name and picture had not been used for advertising purposes
as required by § 51. 304 N.Y. at 358-59, 107 N.E.2d at 488. In a concurring opinion, Judge
Desmond expressed his view that the correct result had been reached for the wrong reasons.
Recognizing that plaintiff, a professional entertainer, was not concerned at all with the
invasion of his privacy, Judge Desmond found that plaintiff's "real complaint, and perhaps
a justified one, but one we cannot redress in this suit brought under the the New York 'Right
of Privacy' statutes, is that he was not paid for the telecasting of his show." Id. at 361, 107
N.E.2d at 489 (Desmond, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
,17 See Gordon, supra note 174; Nimmer, supra note 175; Right of Publicity, supra note
175; Comment, Invasion of Privacy-Recovery for Nonconsentual Use of Photographs in
Motion Pictures Based on the Appropriation of Property, 11 DuQ. L. REv. 358 (1973).
"I Two basic theories may be invoked in an action for appropriation of tangible personal
property. The first theory allows plaintiff to waive the tort and sue in assumpsit, in effect
disregarding the wrongfulness of defendant's conduct and consenting to any sale of the prop-
erty. If plaintiff opts for this theory, he may recover the entire proceeds of the sale, and thus
the profits he would have made had he sold the goods himself. D.B. DOBBS, REMEDIES § 5.15,
at 414-17 (1973). Under the second theory, the traditional action for conversion, the basic
measure of damages is the value of the property "at the time and place of conversion." Id. §
5.14, at 403.
2 Profits generated by defendant's appropriation of plaintiff's public personality should
be recoverable as in any wrongful appropriation action. See note 198 and accompanying text
supra. In addition, since defendant may have misled the public into believing that the
plaintiff has endorsed his product, plaintiff might be deprived of other contracts which
otherwise would have been available. It is submitted that plaintiff should be compensated
for such lost opportunities.
2" While the language of § 51 does not limit the amount of compensatory damages which
may be awarded, in most cases large judgments would not be warranted because the courts
have consistently interpreted the statute as authorizing compensation for hurt feelings only.
In the few opinions indicating the amount recovered under § 51, the amount is relatively
small. See Redmond v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 277 N.Y. 707, 708, 14 N.E.2d 636, 637 (1938)
(mem.) ($1,500 damages); Nolls v. Coral Records, Inc., 22 App. Div. 2d 955, 956, 255 N.Y.S.2d
912, 913 (2d Dep't 1964) (mem.) (reduction of jury verdict from $20,000 to $1,500 in exemplary
and $500 in compensatory damages); Gordon, supra note 174, at 567 ("where damages have
been awarded, they have been nominal"). Illustrative of the courts' propensity to limit dam-
ages in actions under § 51 is the decision in Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc., 43 Misc. 2d 219,
250 N.Y.S.2d 529 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1964), aff'd, 23 App. Div. 2d 216, 260 N.Y.S.2d 451
(1st Dep't 1965), aff'd on other grounds, 18 N.Y.2d 324, 221 N.E.2d 543, 274 N.Y.S.2d 877
(1966). In Spahn, the trial court had awarded damages of $10,000 for an unauthorized biogra-
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Of further significance is the Lombardo court's recognition that
the protection provided by the right of publicity extends beyond the
name, portrait, and picture aspects of the personality which are
covered by the right of privacy."' An influential factor in the second
department's decision to sustain the cause of action for infringe-
ment of the right of publicity on the facts in Lombardo was the
presence of public deception."2 Since a significant portion of the
viewing audience might have been led to believe that Guy Lom-
bardo was appearing and endorsing defendant's product, the exploi-
tation was as real as if his name or picture were used.0 3 While such
a holding may raise the specter of frivolous claims, employment of
a proper standard for evaluating publicity claims should adequately
safeguard against this contingency. The test suggested by the
Lombardo dissent for judging a section 51 action, under which the
court would look to the totality of the circumstances, focusing upon
the nature of the representation, the medium used, and the public's
understanding of the representation, seems to be an appropriate
criterion capable of identifying genuine publicity claims.0 '
In the final analysis, the Lombardo decision, although bold,
appears logically sound and supported by strong policy considera-
tions. By recognizing a separate cause of action premised upon the
right of publicity, the court has expressly sanctioned a proposition
advanced by courts and commentators alike, that an individual has
a protectable interest in his public personality. The unique factual
situation presented in Lombardo illustrates the narrow parameters
of section 51 and the difficulties of incorporating a right of publicity
phy of the plaintiff. 43 Misc. 2d at 233, 250 N.Y.S. at 544. While the action was brought under
§ 51, the court stated that damages under the statute could include recovery for appropriation
of property interests protected by the right of publicity. Id. at 226, 250 N.Y.S.2d at 537. The
appellate division, however, in affirming the award of damages, rejected the trial court's
rationale:
Compensation was properly limited to modest proportions because the offending
book was a laudatory one . . . . Nor is plaintiff entitled to interest on the award
since it does not compensate for an external economic interest ...
23 App. Div. 2d at 218, 260 N.Y.S.2d at 452-53 (1st Dep't 1965) (citations omitted).
20' 58 App. Div. 2d at 622, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 664.
202 Id.
20 There have been surprisingly few right of publicity cases in which the alleged appro-
priation did not involve the use of a name or picture. In Booth v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 362
F. Supp. 343, 345 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), plaintiff claimed that defendants had used an actress to
imitate her well-known voice in a television commercial. The court disposed of plaintiff's right
of publicity argument by observing that all of the precedents cited involved an appropriation
of name or picture.
2 See 58 App. Div. 2d at 623, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 666 (Titone, J., & Suozzi, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part); text accompanying note 189 supra.
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into that statute.2 5 The flexibility of the common law, however,
should provide a viable alternative for dealing with the variety of
situations likely to arise as long as there are products to be marketed
and celebrities to endorse them.
5 Since the rights created by the Civil Rights Law are deemed personal, they are not
transferable by assignment and not descendable upon death. Price v. Hal Roach Studios,
Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836, 844 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Schumann v. Loew's Inc., 135 N.Y.S.2d 361, 365
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1954); Donenfeld, Property or Other Rights in the Names, Likenesses
or Personalities of Deceased Persons, 16 BULL. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 17, 17-18 (1968). In Price, the
court stated the rationale for these limitations as follows:
Since the theoretical basis for the classic right of privacy, and of the statutory right
in New York, is to prevent injury to feelings, death is a logical conclusion to any
such claim. In addition, based upon the same theoretical foundation, such a right
of privacy is not assignable during life.
400 F. Supp. at 844 (footnote omitted).
In contrast, decisions concerning the transferability of the right of publicity are in con-
flict. The Price court held that the right of publicity, because of its commercial nature and
categorization as a property right, is assignable during life and descendable upon death. Id.
at 844. In reaching this conclusion, the court relied heavily upon Lugosi v. Universal Pictures
Co., 172 U.S.P.Q. 541, 551 (Cal. Super. Ct. L.A. County 1972), wherein a California trial court
held that Bela Lugosi's right of publicity passed to his heirs under his will, on the ground
that it was a property right. Subsequent to Price, however, the California Court of Appeals
reversed Lugosi, 70 Cal. App. 3d 552, 139 Cal. Rptr. 35 (Ct. App. 1977), emphasizing that
some of the claims by the heirs were based on rights never exercised by Lugosi himself, and
observing further that if the right were held descendable generations could pass before a
descendent might claim it. This, the court stated, would be in direct conflict with "society's
interest in the free dissemination of ideas." Id. at 557, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 40. Although the court
seemed to intimate that descendability restrictions should be imposed only upon rights unex-
ercised during the individual's lifetime, its ultimate holding was couched in very broad terms:
"We hold that the right to exploit name and likeness is personal to the artist and must be
exercised, if at all, by him during his lifetime." Id.
The Lugosi decision highlights two important but conflicting interests. Since this society
favors the free dissemination of ideas, at some point a celebrity's name, likeness, and person-
ality should become part of the public domain. At the same time, it seems unfair to prohibit
an individual from disposing of the property interest in his personality at death. In an attempt
to reconcile these two interests, one student author has suggested that the right of publicity
should be exercisable during the celebrity's life and for 50 years thereafter. Comment,
Tra sfer of the Right of Publicity: Dracula's Progeny and Privacy's Stepchild, 22 U.C.L.A.
L. Rav. 1103, 1128 (1975).
